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EXPERIENCE RATING: INSURANCE VERSUS EFFICIENCY∗
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Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, Canada;
Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Canada
Unemployment insurance (UI) distorts ﬁrms’ layoff decisions by reducing
the cost of laying off workers. To dampen this increase, it has been suggested
that UI should be ﬁnanced with an experience-rated tax. Despite the fact that increasing the level of 
experience rating can reduce unemployment, it can reduce
the insurance coverage workers receive. With high experience rating, ﬁrms may
reduce their severance payments by more than the UI beneﬁt. We build a model
where competitive ﬁrms offer contracts with severance payments to risk-averse workers. Frictions in 
the labor market lead to incomplete insurance. This article
shows that less than full-experience rating enables the government to increase the insurance coverage 
workers receive. Welfare implications are also investigated.
1. INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of unemployment insurance (UI) is to provide coverage 
to workers in the presence of risky future employment opportunities. However, 
UI reduces the cost to ﬁrms of laying off workers, and consequently, ﬁrms 
increase the number of layoffs leading to more unemployment. One instrument 
to dampen or eliminate this perverse effect is using experience rating to ﬁnance 
unemploy-ment insurance. Under an experience-rated system, ﬁrms pay a tax 
proportional to the total cost their layoff decisions impose on the UI program. 
Without experi-ence rating, UI acts like a subsidy for ﬁrms who lay off workers. 
Experience rating increases the cost of laying off workers, and can 
counterbalance this negative dis-tortion. With perfect experience rating when 
ﬁrms pay the full cost of their layoffs, Topel and Welch (1980) demonstrated that 
unemployment does not increase with the introduction of such a program. One 
important question that has been over-looked in the literature is how experience 
rating affects the government’s ability to better insure workers against 
unemployment when ﬁrms privately offer some insurance. Privately provided 
insurance beneﬁts, that is, severance payments, are reduced when there is public 
provision of UI. One of the two main objectives of this article is to assess how the 
level of experience rating can affect the ability
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2of public UI to actually increase insurance coverage workers receive. In a world
with frictions in the labor market, layoffs are already distorted. Can imperfect
experience rating help undo such initial distortions? The answer will depend on
whether the labor market is characterized by moral hazard or adverse selection.
Topel and Welch (1980) and Feldstein (1976) demonstrate that an efﬁcient
UI system has full-experience rating, since ﬁrms fully internalize all of the costs
associated with their decisions. However, in practice, experience rating is not
prevalent. Most countries use only payroll taxes to ﬁnance their UI programs.
Those countries that do use experience rating, like the United States, do so only
partially. So if experience rating is efﬁcient, then why is it not a more prominent
feature in unemployment insurance programs? Marceau (1993) and Burdett and
Wright (1989) show that increasing the level of experience rating could lead to
more unemployment.UnderCournot competitionwith free entry, orwith variable
ﬁrm size, increasing the degree of experience rating can increase unemployment
by reducing the number of ﬁrms or by reducing ﬁrm size.
This article highlights other potentially undesirable effects of experience rat-
ing. When experience rating increases, private insurance in the form of severance
payments may be reduced by more than the UI beneﬁt, reducing coverage for
unemployed workers. With risk-averse workers, such reductions in coverage have
welfare implications. For such an effect to be present, we need to consider an econ-
omy with frictions. In the absence of frictions, full insurance will always arise, and
the effect noted above would not be present. Looking at the impact of experience
rating in the presence of frictions has been neglected in the literature. Frictions
may lead to excessive layoffs, but also to too excessive retention. In the latter case,
less than full-experience rating may be welfare improving by increasing layoffs.
We construct a model where workers are subject to permanent layoffs.2 Al-
though not all layoffs are permanent, permanent layoffs do constitute a signiﬁ-
cant portion of total layoffs.3 Because workers are risk averse, ﬁrms can provide
long-term insurance contracts to workers by using severance payments.4 Without
frictions, a ﬁrm’s optimal contract fully insures workers, and layoffs are efﬁcient
without public intervention. An increase in unemployment beneﬁts is followed by
an equal reduction in private severance payments, regardless of the level of experi-
ence rating. Since less than full-experience rating increases layoffs, full-experience
rating ensures efﬁcient allocation. However, such results may not be obtained in
the presence of frictions.
2 With the exception of our section on adverse selection, most of the results in this article will hold
when layoffs are temporary, as long as we restrict ourselves to UI systems, like in the United States,
where beneﬁts are only given to laid-off workers, and not to workers who are victims of reduced work
hours. For a discussion of such alternate systems, see Burdett and Wright (1989).
3 Oswald (1986) notes that from 1973 to 1976 in the United States, 40% of layoffs in the manufac-
turing sector were permanent, and Picot et al. (1998) found that the permanent layoff rate in Canada
ﬂuctuated from 8.7% to 7.3% between 1982 and 1993.
4 The 2000NationalCompensationSurvey (BLS) show that 21%of allworkers in themanufacturing
sector receive severance payments. Moreover, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov),
severance payments represent 0.1% of the total compensation for employees in private sector ﬁrms
with less than 100 employees, and this number reaches 0.3% for private sector ﬁrms with more than
500 employees.
3Many different environments lead to labormarket frictions. For example,moral
hazard or adverse selection in the labor market could affect contract offers. First,
we consider a moral-hazard environment. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) show that
when effort is unobservable, layoffs can disciplineworkers.Workers who shirk can
be punished by being laid off and made to suffer the cost of being unemployed.
Given an adequate wage and cost of being unemployed, workers will choose to
provide the desired level of effort. Suffering a cost when laid off is essential in such
a context. If a worker can costlessly ﬁnd a new job with the same wage once laid
off, shirking is the optimal decision. In this article, ﬁrms offer severance payments
to workers in order to provide them with insurance against exogenous shocks.
However, it is reasonable to believe that it could be difﬁcult or impossible for a
third party to assess the reason for separation. McLeod and Malcomson (1989)
and Carmichael (1983) have illustrated that, because it is difﬁcult for a third party
to observewho initiated a job separation, contracts with severance paymentsmust
be supported by self-enforcing arrangements. For example, consider a ﬁrm that
wishes to reduce its workforce. If its contracts only require that it pay severance
in the event of a layoff, it would have an incentive to put pressure on employees
to quit. Since this is not veriﬁable, any self-enforcing contract would require that
severance be paid in the event of any separation. Consequently, ﬁrms will have to
pay severance payments both to workers who are laid off for stochastic reasons
and to those who are caught shirking. In this environment, full insurance will not
be offered toworkers, since it will provide no incentive for effort to be undertaken.
As discussed in Mookherjee (1986), under such contracts the “non-indifference
principle” applies, in the sense that laid-off workers would strictly prefer not to
be laid off.
This yields two important results. First, even without UI, layoff decisions are
distorted. Second, this distortion takes the form of excessive retention. Since ﬁrms
are unable to provide full insurance, they may try to compensate workers by
reducing theprobabilityof layoffs.This leads to too few layoffs,which is in the same
line asAcemoglu and Shimer (1999) orMookherjee (1986). The level of insurance
workers enjoy will vary with the level of experience rating. With full-experience
rating, layoffs are not distorted by the provision of UI, and consequently the
incentive constraint is independent of the generosity of the beneﬁts. However,
with less than-full experience rating, ﬁrms will increase their layoffs when UI
beneﬁts increase. As a consequence the optimal contract will stipulate a larger
difference between wages and severance payments. This implies that less than
full-experience rating decreases the total insurance, both private and public, which
the worker receives. Lower experience rating could increase layoff efﬁciency, but
harms workers in terms of the level of insurance they receive.
We contrast these ﬁndings with those from a second environment in which
there is adverse selection in the labor market. We assume that workers have an
unobserved ability and that ﬁrms cannot commit to retain low-ability workers. If
ﬁrms have no prior information about a worker’s ability on the job, and if they
cannot contract on this nonveriﬁable ability, they only have the option of hiring
workers as wage workers, whom they may possibly wish to lay off in the future.
Once working, ﬁrms and workers learn workers’ abilities. At some point, ﬁrms
4must decide whether to retain or to lay off each worker on the basis of their
observed ability. When a worker is laid off, other ﬁrms make inferences about
the average ability of both ﬁred and retained workers. Laid-off workers are in-
ferred to have low ability and therefore receive low wage offers. Gibbons and
Katz (1991) shows that postdisplacement wage offers are lower for workers dis-
placed by layoffs than for those displaced by plant closings; this suggests that
important information is contained in the layoff decisions of ﬁrms. Since laid-off
workers are only able to generate low future wage offers, the “non-indifference
principle” applies unless ﬁrms provide adequate severance payments. For fur-
ther discussion, see Rogerson and Wright (1988) or Greenwald (1986). On the
other hand, retained workers are inferred to have a higher ability, and are made
wage offers to attract them away from their current employers. This implies that
ﬁrms have to make initial wage offers to workers that are large enough to ensure
loyalty.
In a similar framework, Waldman (1984) shows that when a worker’s ability
is the private information of his present employer, but other ﬁrms are able to
observe promotions, ﬁrms will tend to promote too few workers. The reason is
that promoted workers have to be paid according to their inferred average ability,
whereas ﬁrms make promotion decisions according to the marginal ability of the
worker. In this environment, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms lay off toomanyworkers relative to
the efﬁcient allocation. Laing (1994) has also examined the impact of asymmetric
information on ﬁrms’ layoff decisions. He has also shown that there are too many
layoffs and that seniority rules may be able to eliminate this distortion. Seniority
rules eliminate some ﬁrm discretion in making layoffs, and make it more difﬁcult
for ﬁrms to infer the ability ofworkers after observing a layoff decision.Weassume
perfect discretion when it comes to making layoffs.
Firms do not offer full insurance because high wages are required to retain
workers. This results in too many layoffs, and anything less than full-experience
rating will just exacerbate the problem. However, the impact of experience rat-
ing on severance payments will be positive. With less than full-experience rating,
ﬁrms do not internalize the full cost of their layoffs, increasing their frequency.
With more layoffs, the return to keeping a worker is higher, and, consequently,
increasing UI beneﬁts relaxes the constraint on wages. Therefore, private sever-
ance payments will decrease by less than the increase in UI beneﬁts, increasing
the level of insurance.
In the next section, we present the basic model, and then describe the sequence
of events governing ﬁrm decisions. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium in
each environment and the impact of government intervention. Finally, we brieﬂy
discuss an efﬁcient UI system and provide some concluding remarks. All proofs
are in the appendix.
2. THE MODEL
This one-period economy is composed of a large number (N) of identical risk-
averse workers. Their twice continuously differentiable, concave utility function
is given byU = U(W + R), whereW is outside income andR is home production.
5This homeproduction takes a valueof zero if theworker is employedandapositive
value of r if the worker is unemployed. Each worker supplies one unit of effort
inelastically to the ﬁrm that offers the highest wage.
A large number of identical, perfectly competitive ﬁrms each have one job
opening. Firms take output prices, which are normalized to one, as given, and
are risk neutral. It is assumed that ﬁrms have full discretion over their layoff
decisions. A worker’s productivity depends on a matching variable  ∈ {0, θ},
and their employer’s investment in capital k. All ﬁrms know the distribution of
this matching variable: It takes the value of either θ or of zero. We assume that
E()> r , implying that somematchedworkers aremore productive at home than
at work, but on average matched workers are more productive at work. The ﬁrm
can improve aworker’s productivity by investing in capital. This investment can be
interpreted inaverygeneral fashion, asphysical capital,managerial humancapital,
or even investment in a better screening process for hiring. Essentially, this could
represent any capital investment that is inplacebefore theworker is hired.The cost
of such investment is given by c(k), where c′(k)> 0 and c′′(k)> 0. This investment
will affect the worker’s productivity. The cost of such investment is sunk, and
the investment is fully observable by workers. Firms have the opportunity to lay
off workers with whom they are badly matched or those who do not exert the
required effort. To ensure some positive amount of unemployment, we assume
that the ﬁrmcanonly hire at time zero; soworkerswho are laid offwill be unable to
ﬁnd another job.5 We use a very simple discrete matching technology. A worker’s
productivity will take the value θ , with probability q(k), and zero, with probability
1− q(k), where q′(k)> 0 and q′′(k)< 0.6 The advantage of such technology is that
layoff decisions are simple; in equilibrium, a worker will be laid off if the match
is of value zero and kept when the match is of value θ . An inefﬁcient contract
will have an impact on layoffs by affecting k and therefore the probability of a
good match.
In this environment, many different types of contracts are possible. Since the
goal of this article is not to describe all possible contracts, but rather to look at
the impact of the UI system on the substitutability between public and private
unemployment beneﬁts, we restrict the type of contracts available in some fairly
natural ways to ensure that severance payments arise in equilibrium. First, we
assume that ﬁrms are able to commit to future wages and severance payments,
thus implying they are enforceable contract terms. However, ﬁrms cannot commit
to layoff decisions at the time of contracting, implying that in equilibriumworkers
will believe that ﬁrms will layoff workers according to proﬁt-maximizing behavior
at the time of the layoffs, and not according to any announcements made at the
time of contracting. In otherwords, layoff decisions are time consistent.Moreover,
ability, effort, matching productivity, and investments in capital are all assumed to
be nonveriﬁable by a third party, and therefore they cannot be contracted upon.
5 This assumption can be relaxed. As long as there exists some friction that implies that workers
who are laid off do not ﬁnd a new job instantly, unemployment will still exist.
6 It is intuitive to interpret k as an investment prior to hiring to ensure a good match, like a good
screening process.
6In this model, contracting will not necessarily lead to efﬁcient outcomes. As a
consequence, these frictions maymotivate government intervention.We consider
two different questions related to government intervention. First, if a government
wishes to provide some public UI, how can it ﬁnance the UI program without
introducing further distortions into the ﬁrm’s contracting and layoff decisions?
Second, howdoes government intervention affect the equilibriumcontract offered
by the ﬁrm, especially the level of insurance provided by the combination of public
UI and private severance payments? We only consider government intervention
in the provision of UI. The beneﬁt paid to unemployed workers is denoted b.
Further, we assume that the government ﬁnances this program by taxing ﬁrms.
Let T be the total tax imposed on ﬁrms, which is composed of two parts. The
ﬁrst part is a payroll tax τ , whereas the second is an experience-rated tax, where
ﬁrms pay a proportion e of the total cost they impose on the UI system due
to their layoff decisions.7 Since each ﬁrm has only one position, the total tax
paid by the ﬁrm will be τ if the worker hired is retained and eb if the worker is
laid off. The government’s total revenue is given by T = qτ + (1 − q)eb, where
q is the equilibrium aggregate proportion of workers who are not laid off, and
the total spending is given by (1 − q)b. Given that all ﬁrms are identical, the
government budget constraint is given by (1 − q)(1 − e)b= qτ . Note that under a
full-experience rating system (e = 1), a payroll tax equal to zero would balance the
budget.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, ﬁrms choose their level of investment
in capital k and offer a contract {w, s, k}, wherew is thewage and s is the severance
payment offered to a worker if she is laid off.We restrict our attention to contracts
where w > s. Then, workers choose to work or to shirk for the ﬁrm that offers the
best contract. Next, ﬁrms observe the match values of their workers. Firms then
choose whether or not to lay off their workers, and pay severance payments or
wages depending on their choice. Finally, production takes place, and all payments
are made.
Firms compete to attract workers by offering contracts {w, s, k} that maximize
the expected utility of workers subject to their zero-proﬁt condition.8 With this
simple layoff decision, the expected utility is given by q(k)U(w)+ [1− q(k)]U(s +
r + b). The zero-proﬁt condition is given by E[π ] = q(k)[θ − w − τ ] −
[1 − q(k)](s + eb) − c(k) = 0. We look at equilibrium contracts in two differ-
ent contractual environments. In particular, moral hazard and adverse selection
each impose additional restrictions on the contracts that ﬁrms will choose to of-
fer in equilibrium. We denote such constraints as g(w, s, k) = 0 for the moment,
and specify the particular form for each case later. These constraints are affected
by the UI system. Varying the level of experience rating may tighten or relax
these constraints, implying different results depending on the nature of these
constraints.
7 In practice, experience-rated taxes are implemented at the industry level to provide insurance
against any idiosyncratic shocks.
8 Contracts without severance payments, s = 0 or even s < 0, may be possible, in particular if r is
large. We assume that r is sufﬁciently small so that in equilibrium s > 0.




q(k)U(w) + [1 − q(k)]U(r + s + b)
subject to: q(k)[θ − w − τ ] − [1 − q(k)](s + eb) − c(k) = 0 and g(w, s, k) = 0
In other words, ﬁrms maximize worker’s expected utility subject to a zero-
proﬁt constraint, and the constraint on wages and severance payments given by
the particular labor market environment.
3. EQUILIBRIUM
3.1. Labor Market without Frictions. To understand how different labor con-
tracting environments inﬂuence equilibrium contracts and how that interacts with
the UI program, we compare it to the contract offered in a frictionless environ-
ment. To do so, we solve for the equilibrium contract when the g(w, s, k) = 0
constraint is not binding.
LEMMA 1. When the constraint g(w, s, k) = 0 is not binding, the equilibrium
contract fully insures workers against unemployment by setting w = s + r + b.
Because workers are risk averse, ﬁrms equalize the utility of workers across
employment states, which implies that w = s + r + b. This result is well known in
the literature.
PROPOSITION 1. In a frictionless world:
(i) Given any value of e (and the corresponding τ ), workers are fully insured
for any level of b < w − r .
(ii) With full-experience rating, (e = 1 and τ = 0), the investment in capital
chosen by ﬁrms is such that the net production surplus (which is given by
q(k)θ + [1 − q(k)]r − c(k)) is maximized. With less than full-experience
rating (e < 1 and τ > 0), ﬁrms choose inefﬁciently low investments in
capital, leading to a higher probability of layoffs compared to the capital
level, which maximizes the net production surplus.
(iii) Finally, for anyUI systemwith less than full-experience rating, theprovision
of an unemployment beneﬁt b> 0 reduces workers’ ex ante expected utility,
whereas a similar system with full-experience rating with (unemployment
beneﬁt 0 < b < w − r) leaves the workers with the same ex ante expected
utility.
Result (ii) is consistent with Topel andWelch (1980). Since in their paper work-
ers were basically risk neutral, production surplus is an appropriate measure of
welfare. The introduction of publically provided UI allows ﬁrms to reduce their
severance payments, and consequently, to reduce the private cost of laying off a
8worker. This reduces the ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in increasing the probability of
a good match. With full-experience rating, ﬁrms internalize the full cost of their
layoffs, and consequently choose the capital investment that maximizes the net
surplus given by q(k)θ + [1 − q(k)]r − c(k). Investment in capital is such that
q′(k)(θ − r) = c′(k), the marginal increase in the probability of a good match
multiplied by the marginal gain from a goodmatch equals the marginal cost of the
capital investment. However in the present article, workers are risk averse. Since
all ﬁrms make zero proﬁt in equilibrium and workers are ex ante identical using
ex ante expected utility is a more appropriate measure of welfare. Without fric-
tions in the labor market, ﬁrms fully insure workers. Since wages are set through
a zero-proﬁt condition, wages will be maximized when the production surplus is
maximized. So, not surprisingly (ii) and (iii) lead to identical results.
Part (i) of the proposition is more relevant to the focus of this article. The
impact of experience rating on layoff decisions has been well studied. However
as mentioned before, the impact of experience rating on the private provision
of insurance has received little attention. In a world without frictions, severance
payments are a perfect substitute for public UI programs in terms of insurance,
since ﬁrms fully insure workers anyway.
3.2. Moral Hazard. To introduce moral hazard, we assume that after accept-
ing a contract from a ﬁrm, but before thematch value has been revealed, a worker
canmake a nonveriﬁable investment in some speciﬁc human capital. If the worker
does notmake the investment thematch is of value zerowith probability one; if the
worker invests the match value will be θ with probability q(k).9 This investment
costs α; for simplicity, we assume that this cost enters the worker’s utility function
linearly, U = U(W + R) − α. Because of the nonveriﬁability of the investment,
wages cannot be contingent on this investment, but workers who do not invest
may be laid off. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm will choose w > s, and will lay off all
workers with lowmatch values (zero), and will retain all workers with goodmatch
values (θ). A worker chooses to make the investment (or effort) if q(k)U(w) +
[1 − q(k)]U(s + r + b) − α ≥ U(s + r + b). The problem faced by ﬁrms is the
same as deﬁned in Section 2 where the function g(w, s, k) = 0 is the incentive
constraint given above.
LEMMA 2. With moral hazard, the equilibrium contract offers imperfect
insurance, w > s + r + b.
This result is not surprising; to satisfy the incentive constraint, ﬁrmsmust create
a gap between the wages offered and the unemployment package, so workers ﬁnd
9 This way of introducing moral hazard departs from the standard shirking model, where a worker
has the choice between working hard (investing α) and shirking. If she works hard, she can stay with
the ﬁrm and her payoff is U(w) − α. On the other hand, if she chooses to shirk, then she faces the
probability q(k) of being caught where q′(k) > 0. If caught, her payoff is U(s + r + b), but if she is
not, her payoff is U(w). Her expected utility from shirking is therefore (1 − q(k))U(w) + q(k)U(s +
r + b). In this interpretation, the nonshirking constraint is identical to that used in this model. The
problem of using the standard approach is that in equilibrium there are no layoffs, so it is hard to talk
about UI.
9it preferable to make the investment (or to provide effort). Since workers are not
fully insured, unemployment insurancemay be justiﬁed if it improves insurance to
workers by increasing the welfare of laid-off workers. However, this has obvious
consequences for the ﬁrm’s ability to extract effort.
PROPOSITION 2. With the presence of moral hazard:
(i) Under full-experience rating (e = 1), an increase in b is counteracted by
an equal reduction in s. With less than full-experience rating (e < 1), an
increase in b is compensated by a larger reduction in the severance payment.
(ii) With full-experience rating (e = 1), the investment in capital chosen by a
ﬁrm is such that the net production surplus (which is given by q(k)θ +
[1 − q(k)]r − c(k)) is not maximized. More speciﬁcally, ﬁrms overinvest
compared to the investment that would maximize surplus.
(iii) Finally, for any UI system with less than full-experience rating, the provi-
sion of an unemployment beneﬁt b > 0 reduces workers’ ex ante expected
utilities, whereas a similar system with full-experience rating (with unem-
ployment beneﬁt 0 < b < w − r) leaves the workers with the same ex ante
expected utility.
The ﬁrst result of Proposition 2 is important: It describes what happens to
private severance payments when the government provides UI beneﬁts at dif-
ferent levels of experience rating. When e = 1, a ﬁrm who lays off a worker
pays the full cost of the layoff, so the UI beneﬁt and the severance payment
are perfect substitutes. Consequently, the ﬁrm’s layoff decisions are not affected
by changes in beneﬁts, b. However, when e < 1, since ﬁrms do not internalize
the full cost of their layoffs, an increase in b is associated with an increase in
layoffs (which implies a decrease in k). More layoffs imply that the incentive
constraint becomes harder to satisfy, because those workers who choose to in-
vest receive the wage w with a lower probability. Consequently, the difference
between w and s + r + b must increase. This implies that private severance pay-
ments decrease by more than the increase in b. Therefore, workers receive less
insurance.
The second part of Proposition 2 considers the level of capital investment with
full-experience rating compared to the level that maximized the production sur-
plus. Capital investment is lower than optimal, implying that the level of unem-
ployment is too high. The intuition is as follows. Because workers are not fully
insured, the probability of being laid off affects the expected utility of a worker.
By reducing the probability of layoffs with a larger investment in k, ﬁrms can
attract workers at a lower cost. The intuition of such a result is along the same
lines as Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). The added contribution is that for the UI
system to increase production surplus, there has to be imperfect experience rating.
Less than full-experience rating could positively affect production surplus. Low
levels of experience rating increase layoffs, and by doing so, can relax incentive
constraints.
The ﬁrst two parts of the proposition state that with less than full-experience
rating, UI crowds out private severance by more, leaving the worker less insured.
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On theother hand, such a systemprovides better incentives in termsofmaximizing
the surplus. Onemay think that the second argument is a justiﬁcation for less than
full experience. However, the reduction in insurance harms workers. The last part
of the Proposition 2 concludes that the cost due to the reduction in the insurance
coverage outweighs the beneﬁt of higher production surplus. Consequently, full-
experience rating system maximizes the workers’ ex ante expected utility, leaving
no valid reason for the use of a less than full-experience UI system.
3.3. Asymmetric Information. The next model is one where ﬁrms have pri-
vate information about the quality of their own workers.Waldman (1984) demon-
strated that ﬁrms who have private information about the quality of their workers
will distort their promotion behavior in equilibrium. When promotion is observ-
able, outside ﬁrms make inferences about the ability of promoted workers and
may try to bid them away. Promotions are based on the marginal ability of work-
ers, but because the wages required to retain promoted workers are based on their
inferred average ability, ﬁrms will tend to promote too few workers. Gibbons and
Katz (1991) applied the same intuition to layoff choices.
We introduce this type of inefﬁciency in a very simple way. Instead of θ being
a ﬁrm-speciﬁc match value, we now interpret it as a general skill ability. This
is essentially a lemons problem: A ﬁrm can invest k units of effort to ﬁnd out
which workers from the pool of applicants are good, that is, have ability θ . A
larger investment yields a higher probability q(k) of ﬁnding a good worker. Once
hired, the worker’s true ability is revealed to both the worker and the ﬁrm.10 With
probability q(k), the worker has a high ability level of θ , and with probability 1 −
q(k), the worker has a low ability level of zero. The cost of effort k is c(k), and the
previous assumptions on this function apply.
Because of the interaction between the worker’s general skill and the ﬁrm’s
competitive behavior, we need to introduce some ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital.
The productivity of the worker at the original ﬁrm is given by the ability of the
worker multiplied by (1+ f ), which represents some learning by doing or speciﬁc
human capital. Such an assumption is common in this literature; see Waldman
(1984) or Scoones and Bernhardt (1998).
If a worker’s ability is revealed to be zero, then the ﬁrm will lay off the worker
as long as w ≥ s, and this worker will join the pool of unemployed workers. On
the other hand, if the worker’s ability is θ , the ﬁrm will keep the worker. When
a ﬁrm decides to keep a worker, it is essentially advertising that the worker has
high ability. We assume that new ﬁrms with the same production function and
with an open position can try to attract these high-ability workers. The after-tax
productivity of a worker at a new ﬁrm is given by θ − τ , which is the wage offered
by those ﬁrms. Consequently, if the original ﬁrm wants to retain the worker, they
need to match this wage offer, imposing the constraint w ≥ θ − τ .11 Here again,
10 We assume that workers do not know their ability level prior to the match to eliminate the
possibility of screening contracts.
11 It is assumedhere that aworker can freelymove to another ﬁrm.Moreover, if severance payments
are negative, workers could optimally decide to stay even if the alternatewage offer is better.However,
such types of contracts will provide bad insurance, and if workers are sufﬁciently risk averse, it will
not be optimal for the ﬁrm to offer it because of the large risk premium it must include.
11
the problem faced by ﬁrms is the same as in Subsection 3.1, where the function
g(w, s, k) = 0 is simply w = θ − τ .
LEMMA 3. Under asymmetric information, the equilibrium contract does not
fully insure workers against unemployment, implying w > s + r + b.
It is impossible for the ﬁrm to fully insure workers with severance payments
and simultaneously satisfy the zero-proﬁt condition because of the high wages
they need to offer to workers they choose to retain.
PROPOSITION 3. With asymmetric information:
(i) Under full-experience rating (e = 1), an increase in b is counteracted by an
equal reduction in s.With less than full-experience rating (e<1),an increase
in b is compensated by a smaller reduction in the severance payment.
(ii) With full-experience rating (e = 1), the investment in capital chosen by
ﬁrms is such that the net production surplus (which is given by q(k)θ +
[1 − q(k)]r − c(k)) is not maximized. More speciﬁcally, ﬁrms underinvest
compared to the investment that would maximize this surplus.
(iii) Finally, for anyUI systemwith less than full-experience rating, theprovision
of an unemployment beneﬁt b> 0 reduces workers’ ex ante expected utility,
whereas a similar system with full-experience rating (with unemployment
beneﬁt 0 < b < w − r) leaves the workers with the same ex ante expected
utility.
With full-experience rating, a ﬁrm that lays off a worker pays the full cost
of the layoff, so the UI beneﬁt and the severance payment are perfect substi-
tutes. Consequently, the ﬁrm’s layoff decision is not affected by an increase in b.
This result is the same as in the moral-hazard case. The reason is that in both
cases, incentive constraints are not affected by changes in the UI beneﬁt b when
e = 1.
However, when e < 1, an increase in b is associated with a smaller decrease in
the private severance payment, s. By keeping a worker, a ﬁrm sends a signal to
outside ﬁrms that the worker is of high ability, and consequently, the wage offered
to these workers needs to be sufﬁciently high to prevent them from being hired
away by other ﬁrms. The proﬁts a ﬁrm will enjoy from keeping a worker depends
on speciﬁc human capital. When f is small, ﬁrms do not generate enough proﬁt to
be able to fully insureworkers, because of the zero-proﬁt condition. To understand
what is happening to s when b increases, imagine that b increases by $1. If ﬁrms
reduce their severance payments by $1, workers will now be receiving the same
severance package, but because e < 1 the zero-proﬁt conditionwill no longer bind.
This result comes from the fact that the cost of a layoff is s + eb. Because workers
are risk averse and not fully insured, ﬁrms will attract workers by increasing the
severance package. To do so, ﬁrms reduce the severance payment by less than $1.
Increasing the UI beneﬁt in this environment relaxes the zero-proﬁt constraints,
leading to a higher level of insurance for workers. This is exactly the opposite of
the moral-hazard case.
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For the second part of Proposition 3, consider the case where τ = 0 and e = 1. In
such a case, there will be too many layoffs due to the small investment in capital.
Because wages are high relative to the severance payment package, ﬁrms extract
a lower surplus from workers they retain. Consequently, ﬁrms have less incentive
to undertake effort to keep workers, implying that the investment in k is lower,
and the probability of layoff is higher. This implies that full-experience rating is
desirable since its does not contribute to further layoffs.
Similar to the previous section, insurance and surplus maximization move in
opposite direction when you introduce UI with less than full-experience rating.
The conclusion is also the same as for the case of moral hazard; full-experience
rating actually maximizes the ex ante expected utility for the same reason as
before.
4. CONCLUSION
In this article, the response of private insurance to changes in the level of ex-
perience rating within an UI system is analyzed under different types of market
structure. At ﬁrst glance, it looked like such a consideration could provide an
argument against the use of high levels of experience rating. In an environment
with moral hazard, a less than fully experience-rated UI system can increase pro-
duction surplus. On the other hand, less than full experience rating can improve
the insurance coverage workers receive when asymmetric information is present.
However, a proper investigation reveals that full experience rating is more suited
to maximizing workers’ ex ante expected utility. The question as to why such low
levels of experience rating are used worldwide remains unanswered. However,
one thing this article does suggest is that partial experience rating, like the one
used in theUnited States, will have varying consequences for the number of layoffs
and the degree of worker insurance across industries, depending on the nature of
contractual frictions that are present.
APPENDIX
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm’s problem can
be rewritten as follows:
U ′(w) − λ = 0(A.1)
U ′(r + s + b) − λ = 0(A.2)
q′(k)[U(w) − U(s + r + b)] + λ[q′(k)(θ − w − τ + s + eb) − c′(k)] = 0(A.3)
q(k)[θ − w − τ ] − [1 − q(k)](s + eb) − c(k) = 0(A.4)
Equations (A.1) and (A.2) represent the trade-off between w and s, whereas
Equation (A.3) dictates the choice of k, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the
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zero-proﬁt constraint. Finally, Equation (A.4) is just the zero-proﬁt condition.We
can see that from (A.1) and (A.2) that w = r + s + b. This implies that k is given
by q′(k)[θ − r − τ − (1 − e)b] = c′(k). 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) Since w = s + r + b, workers are fully insured for all levels of e. Note
that if b>w − r worker would be better off by being laid off. We abstract
from such cases.
(ii) First note that the production surplus is given by q(k)θ + [1 − q(k)]r −
c(k), which is maximized when q′(k)(θ − r)= c′(k). Under full experience
rating, τ = 0 and e= 1, so (A.3) simply becomesq′(k)(θ − r)= c′(k).When
e < 1 and τ > 0, (A.3) becomes q′(k)[θ − r − τ − (1 − e)b] = c′(k), given
thatq′′(k)< 0 and c′′(k)> 0, it implies thatk is smaller than the investment
that maximized the production surplus. Consequently, the probability of
a bad match is too high.
(iii) Given that w = r + s + b the ex ante expected utility is simply given by
U(w), so the contract that maximizes w also maximizes U(w). Because
of the zero-proﬁt condition, we know that the wage is given by q(k)[θ −
w − τ ] − [1 − q(k)](w − r − b+ eb) = c(k), or equivalently w = q(k)[θ −
τ ] + [1 − q(k)] [r + (1 − e) b] − c(k). The government budget constraint
says that q(k) τ = (1 − e)[1 − q(k)]b, so w = q(k)θ + [1 − q(k)] r − c(k),
which take its highest value for e = 1. 
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm’s problem can
be rewritten in the following way:
(1 + µ)U ′(w) − λ = 0(A.5)
[(1 − q(k) + q(k)µ]U ′(r + s + b) − [1 − q(k)]λ = 0(A.6)
q′(k)(1 + µ)[U(w) − U(s + r + b)]
+ λ[q′(k)(θ − w − τ + s + eb) − c′(k)] = 0
(A.7)
q(k)[θ − w − τ ] − [1 − q(k)](s + eb) − c(k) = 0(A.8)
q(k)[U(w) − U(r + s + b)] − α = 0(A.9.)
Equations (A.5) and (A.6) represent the trade-off between w and s, whereas
Equation (A.7) dictates the choice of k, λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the zero-
proﬁt constraint, and µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive constraint.
Finally, Equations (A.8) and (A.9) are the zero-proﬁt condition and the incen-
tive constraint. Using Equations (A.5) and (A.6), we get the following equation:
(1 + µ)(1 − q(k))U ′(w) = [(1 − q(k)) + q(k)µ] U ′(r + s + b). It is easy to see
that (1 + µ)(1 − q(k)) > [1 − q(k) + q(k)µ], and given the concavity of the utility
function, w > r + s + b. 
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) To solve for ∂s
∂b . Let J be the 5 × 5 Jacobian matrix of the derivatives of
(A.5) to (A.9) with respect to w, s, k, λ, and µ. Let Jb be the 5 × 5 matrix,
where we replace in the Jacobian matrix the column of derivatives of the
ﬁrst-order condition with respect to swith the derivative of the ﬁrst-order
condition (A.5) to (A.9) with respect to b. Using Cramer’s rule, ∂s
∂b = |Jb||J | .
Using the envelope theorem, we get that |J | = X, where X is the sum
of 20 terms (avaliable upon request). If the second-order condition is
satisﬁed, the bordered Hessian needs to have the same sign as (−1)5—so
it is negative. Since |J | is the second derivative of theLagrangian function,
which implies that for the second-order condition to be satisﬁed, the ﬁfth
of principal minor needs have the same sign as (−1)5+1. The ﬁfth principal
minor is just |J |, so X > 0. On the other hand, |Jb| = Y + eZ, where
Z is the sum of four positive terms (available upon request). Moreover, if
e = 1, then X= −(Y + Z). This implies that if e = 1, then ∂s
∂b = −1. When
e < 1, then ∂s
∂b = Y+ eZX . Because Z > 0, when e < 1, Y + eZ < Y + Z =
−X, so ∂s
∂b = Y+ eZX < −1.
(ii) The investment that maximized the production surplus k∗ is given by
q′(k∗)[θ − r ] = c′(k∗). Let us evaluate the ﬁrst-order condition of (A.7)
with respect to k, at the ﬁrst-best outcome k∗. As long as the second-order
condition is satisﬁed, if the ﬁrst-order condition evaluated at k∗ is positive
it implies that the equilibrium k is larger than the optimal value, whereas
if the ﬁrst-order condition is negative, it implies that the equilibrium k is
lower. The ﬁrst-order condition of (A.7) evaluated at k∗ is given by
q′(k∗)(1 + µ)[U(w) − U(s + r + b)]
+U ′(w)(1 + µ)[q′(k∗)(θ − w − τ + s + eb) − c′(k∗)]
If we use the ﬁrst-order condition for the ﬁrst-best problem c′(k∗) =
q′(k∗)[θ − r ], we get
q′(k∗)(1 + µ)[U(w) − U(s + r + b)]
+U ′(w)q′(k∗)(1 + µ)[(θ − w − τ + s + eb) − (θ − r)]
The sign of this expression evaluated at e = 1 and τ = 0 is the same as
the following expression:
[U(w) − U(s + r + b)] − U ′(w)[w − (s + b+ r)]
By concavity, this expression is strictly positive, so ﬁrms overinvest
compare to the investment that maximize the production surplus.
(iii) Taking the derivative of the Lagrangian function with respect to b tells us
how an increase in b affect a worker’s expected utility under the optimal
contract. Using the envelope theorem, such a derivative is given by [(1 −
q(k)) + µq(k)]U ′(r + s + b) − λ[1 − q(k)] e. Using ﬁrst-order condition
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(A.6) the expression becomes (1 − e)[(1 − q(k)) + µq(k)]U ′(r + s + b).
For any e < 1, an increase in b translates itself to a decrease in workers’
expected utility, whereas if e = 1 the expected utility at the optimum is
unaffected by b. 
A.5. Proof of Lemma 3. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm’s problem can
be rewritten as follows:
q(k)U′(w) + µ − λq(k) = 0(A.10)
U ′(r + s + b) − λ = 0(A.11)
q′(k)[U(w) − U(s + r + b)]
+ λ[q′(k)(θ(1 + f ) − w − τ + s + eb) − c′(k)] = 0
(A.12)
q(k)[θ(1 + f ) − w − τ ] − [1 − q(k)](s + eb) − c(k) = 0(A.13)
w − θ + τ ≥ 0 [w − θ + τ ]µ = 0(A.14)
Equations (A.10) and (A.11) represent the trade-off between w and s, whereas
Equation (A.12) dictates the choice of k, λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the
zero-proﬁt constraint, and µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the wage constraint.
Finally, Equations (A.13) and (A.14) are the zero-proﬁt condition and the wage
constraint. Using Equations (A.10) and (A.11), we get the following equation
U ′(w) + µq(k) = U ′(r + s + b). The concavity of the utility function implies that
w > r + s + b. Note that if f was large enough, such that the ﬁrst-best contract (the
one which solves (A.10) to (A.13) would give a w > θ − τ , then the last constraint
would not be binding, and the ﬁrst-best contract would be the equilibrium. Since
wewant to concentrate on second-bestworld,wewill assume that f is small enough
so (A.14) binds. 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) We will solve for ∂s
∂b . We simplify the ﬁrst-order condition by substituting
w = θ − τ in the ﬁrst four equations:
q(k)U ′(θ − τ ) + µ − λq(k) = 0(A.15)
U ′(r + s + b) − λ = 0(A.16)
q′(k)[U(θ − τ ) − U(s + r + b)]
+ λ[q′(k)(θ f + s + eb) − c′(k)] = 0
(A.17)
q(k)[θ f ] − [1 − q(k)](s + eb) − c(k) = 0(A.18)
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Let J be the 4 × 4 Jacobian matrix of the derivatives of the above ﬁrst-
order conditions with respect to s, k, λ, and µ, and Jb be the 4 × 4 matrix
substituting the column of derivatives with respect to s with the deriva-
tives with respect to b. Using Cramer’s rule, ∂s
∂b = |Jb||J | . Using the envelope
theorem, |J | = −[1 − q(k)]X − U′′(s + b + r)[q′(k)(θ f + s + eb) −
c′(k)] > 0, where X < 0 is the derivative of (A.12) with respect to k. On
the other hand, |Jb| = e[1 − q(k)]X + U ′′(s + b + r)[q′(k)(θ f + s +
eb) − c′(k)] < 0. This implies that if e = 1, then ∂s
∂b = −1. When e < 1,
then ∂s
∂b = e[1−q(k)]X+U
′′(s + b+ r)[q′(k)(θ f + s + eb)− c′(k)]
− [1−q(k)]X−U′′(s + b+ r)[q′(k)(θ f + s + eb)− c′(k)] . It is easy to show that
e[1− q(k)]X+U ′′(s + b+ r)[q′(k)(θ f + s + eb)− c′(k)]< [1− q(k)]X+
U ′′(s + b + r)[q′(k)(θ f + s + eb) − c′(k)], so ∂s
∂b > −1.
(ii) The ﬁrst-best investment in k∗ is given by q′(k∗)[θ(1 + f ) − r ] = c′(k∗).
Let us evaluate the ﬁrst-order condition of (A.17) with respect to k, at
the ﬁrst-best outcome. As long as the second-order condition is satisﬁed,
if the ﬁrst-order condition evaluated at k∗ is positive it implies that the
equilibrium k is larger than the optimal value, whereas if the ﬁrst-order
condition is negative it implies that the equilibrium k is lower. The ﬁrst-
order conditions (A.17) and (A.16) evaluated at k∗ are given by
q′(k∗)[U(w) − U(s + r + b)]
+U ′(s + r + b)[q′(k∗)(θ f + s + eb) − c′(k∗)]
If we use the ﬁrst-order condition for the ﬁrst-best problem, c′(k∗) =
q′(k∗)[θ(1 + f ) − r ], we get
q′(k∗)[U(w) − U(s + r + b)]
+U ′(s + r + b)q′(k∗)[(θ f + s + eb) − θ(1 + f ) + r ]
The sign of this expression evaluated at e = 1 and τ = 0 is the same as
the following expression:
[U(w) − U(s + r + b)] − U ′(s + r + b)[w − (s + b+ r)]
By concavity, this expression is strictly negative, so the second-best
investment k is lower than the optimum.
(iii) Taking the derivative of the Lagrangian function with respect to b tells us
how an increase in b affect a worker’s expected utility under the optimal
contract. Using the envelope theorem, such a derivative is given by [1 −
q(k)]U ′(r + s + b) − λ[1 − q(k)] e. Using ﬁrst-order condition (A.11)
the expression becomes (1 − e)[1 − q(k)]U′(r + s + b). For any e <
1, an increase in b translates itself to a decrease in workers’ expected
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